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Introduction (1)
Since around 2009, China has reinforced its maritime territorial claimsin the South China Sea (SCS) and has tried to deter other states fromstrengthening their claims at China’s expense. China has employed a
range of diplomatic, administrative, economic, and military tactics to ex-
pand its effective control over disputed territories. (2)
Are China’s tactics based on a well-coordinated plan, or are they the unin-
tended consequence of competition and self-interest among various agen-
cies? Do China’s maritime actors compete for their own narrow interests to
an extent that could disrupt China’s overall strategy? Or are these actors
working under the broad policy direction of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP)? Also, what is the role of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the
SCS? These are questions that this paper will try to answer. 
There are two views on the questions. In one of her recent papers published
in 2014, Linda Jakobson argues that China’s actions in the maritime domain
take place unsystematically and organically rather than as part of a grand
strategy. Various actors cooperate when it serves both parties’ interests, and
“there is no evidence of a central government approved grand plan that man-
dates different actors coercing other claimants in a tailored way.” (3) On the
other hand, Bonnie Glaser argues that China’s various maritime actors are in-
creasingly coordinated and directed by senior policymakers as part of a larger
strategy aimed at protecting China’s sovereignty and maritime rights. (4)
This paper argues that although coordination problems did exist in the
Hu Jintao era, as detailed in Jakobson’s works, coordination among maritime
actors has been improving, especially under the Xi Jinping administration.
Of course, this is not to say that Xi Jinping has overcome all of the problems
in China’s political system at once, but the development of coordination is
an important trend deserving further exploration.
The questions are part of a broader debate on China’s political system.
Since the 1990s, China’s political system has been frequently referred to as
“fragmented authoritarianism” in which authority at the very peak of the
Chinese political system is centralised, but the layers below it are frag-
mented and disjoined. (5)
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There is wide consensus among scholars about the complex nature of the
Chinese political system, but sometimes researchers differ on which aspect
they emphasise.
The first view puts an emphasis on fragmentation. Since the system is frag-
mented, it will be difficult for the central leadership to control all actions of
the agencies. As a result, coordination among China’s agencies tends to be
poor. (6) The second view stresses that even though China looks different from
its Maoist past, “democratic centralism,” an organisational principle of the CCP,
has not essentially changed, and China therefore somehow maintains coher-
ence on important policy issues. (7) This paper adds insight to this debate.
Here we face at least two analytical problems: lack of information and the
complex nature of China’s strategy. It is not easy to know the consequence
of poor coordination or observe the causal relationship between poor coor-
dination and a particular behaviour. Moreover, China’s strategy tends to be
expressed in vague ways and sometimes contains contradictory elements, as
a result of which it is very difficult to obtain information that ascertains which
action by an agency truly deviates from national policy and which does not.
There is no easy way to overcome these analytical problems, but the paper
will focus on Xi Jinping’s power consolidation and institutional reforms that
imply greater coordination, as well as the actual behaviour of maritime ac-
tors that indicate cooperation among actors. Each type of evidence is par-
tial, but when combined this evidence strongly suggests the development
of deeper coordination among maritime actors.
The first section summarises the maritime actors that this paper deals
with, including the State Oceanic Administration/China Coast Guard, local
governments, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), Mar-
itime Militia (Haishang minbing 海上民兵), and PLA Navy (PLAN). These ac-
tors have their own institutional history, interests, and characteristics. The
second section will analyse efforts to improve coordination under Xi Jinping:
power consolidation and his personal initiative, institutional reform, and
inter-agency relations.
The last two sections present two detailed case studies: the oil rig incident
that occurred in 2014 near the Paracel Islands, and island reclamation works
that China is currently conducting in the Spratly Islands. 
China’s main maritime actors 
China’s political system has many organisations related to the maritime
domain, and each of them is under a different chain of command. Coordi-
nation between these organisations is sometimes poor, given the lack of
close coordination among the chains of command.
Maritime law enforcement agencies
Before 2013, there were five civilian law enforcement agencies under inde-
pendent chains of command, including: China Marine Surveillance (CMS)
(Zhongguo haijian 中国海监) under the State Oceanic Administration (SOA)
(Guojia haiyangju 国家海洋局) of the Ministry of Land and Resources; the Fish-
ery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) (Zhongguo yuzheng 中国渔政) of the
Ministry of Agriculture; the China Maritime Police (Zhongguo haijing 中国海
警) under the Border Control Department of the Ministry of Public Security;
the Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) (Haishiju 海事局) of the Ministry
of Transport; and the General Administration of Customs (Haiguan zongshu 海
关总署). Among them, the CMS and FLEC were especially active in China’s law
enforcement activities and became the vanguard of China’s sovereignty claims.
Local governments
Local governments, including the provincial and prefectural levels, are the
primary implementers of general administration in the SCS. First, provincial
governments, including those of Hainan, Guangdong, and Guangxi, have di-
rect responsibility over managing administrative and economic activities in
the SCS. Hainan Province in particular administers all of the nation’s land
and sea claims in the SCS. These activities include law-enforcement, con-
structing infrastructure, logistics, organising maritime militia, and so on. 
Second, in 2012, Beijing established Sansha City (Sansha shi 三沙市), a
prefectural-level city in Hainan Province located on Woody Island, part of
the Paracels. Sansha City is in charge of administering all SCS features, im-
plying Beijing’s intention to enhance actual control over disputed islands
and shoals. We will explore this issue later. 
Maritime Militia
In China, the militia are under the dual command of the State Council and
Central Military Commission. In coastal areas, the local governments and
military have established a Maritime Militia. The Maritime Militia is a dual-
hatted force of specially registered fishing vessels with crews of fishermen-
soldiers. (8) The PLA General Staff Department’s mobilisation department
oversees and formulates regulations for nationwide militia work. At the lev-
els of provincial military districts and sub-districts, militia are organised and
trained under the People’s Armed Forces Departments of local governments.
The National Defence Mobilisation Committee coordinates local govern-
ments and the military. The mission of the Maritime Militia includes military
logistical support, reconnaissance, and participation in combat.
CNOOC
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), one of the 116
centrally-controlled state-owned enterprises under the State-Owned Assets
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, was in-
corporated on 15 February 1982. The CNOOC is responsible for the explo-
ration and development of Chinese offshore oil and gas resources. The top
executives of the CNOOC are appointed by the CCP, so the Party maintains
tight control over the CNOOC. (9)
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The CNOOC has long had the ambition of expanding oil-exploration ac-
tivities in the SCS. The CNOOC advocates a “Second Leap Forward Program”
for developing the maritime oil industry. (10) In 2011, the CNOOC Party group
(dangzu 党组), the Party cell in the company that is the de facto supreme
decision-making body, promulgated “Guidelines for the Second Leap Forward
Program (2011-2030),” which outlined steps to develop the company. Ac-
cording to the program, the first step (2011-2020) involves the CNOOC be-
coming a first-rate international energy company, while the second step
(2021-2030) sets the goal of the CNOOC becoming a comprehensive global
company with soft power. In this context, the CNOOC seeks to increase off-
shore production with an emphasis on the deep waters of the SCS.
Technological advances have expanded the CNOOC’s ability to exploit
offshore resources. The CNOOC has invested large amounts of money in
building its own deep-water drilling capabilities. Its latest platform,
HYSY981, can operate in depths of up to 3,000 meters. The project was
started in 2006 as part of the 863 Program (China’s high-tech state-led de-
velopment plan). The platform has multiple functions, including exploration,
digging, and mending wells, and is equipped with the DP-3 dynamic posi-
tioning system and a satellite navigation system. (11)
PLA Navy
The situation in the SCS is not fully militarised yet, given that the PLAN
has not engaged in direct confrontation with others, but it has supported
other organisations’ activities in the SCS in various ways. As China’s 2012
Defence White Paper noted, “The PLAN provides security support for China’s
maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and oil and gas exploitation. It has es-
tablished mechanisms to coordinate and cooperate with law-enforcement
organs of marine surveillance and fishery administration, as well as a joint
military-police-civilian defence mechanism.” (12)
According to Christopher Yung, the PLAN has formed a “Naval lobby” to
advocate for a more proactive maritime policy, and is often very effective
in coalition building. As an effective bureaucratic player, the PLAN has sub-
stantial if not decisive influence on national policy-making. (13)
A report by the National Institute for Defense Studies (based in Tokyo)
stated that the PLA has become especially proactive regarding the drafting
of legislation relating to the seas. The report shows that since around 2000,
PLA delegates in the NPC have been calling for policy priority to be assigned
to maritime issues by submitting proposals and suggestions to the NPC. (14)
Cooperation between maritime actors
The Xi Jinping factor
Xi Jinping’s power consolidation has contributed to improving coordinated
decision-making on maritime issues. After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, he
quickly consolidated power through an anti-corruption campaign, arguably
establishing the highest authority since Mao Zedong. (15)
In China’s political system, the supreme leader has a preeminent role in
foreign and security policy decision-making processes due to the “three-in-
one” principle. (16) Since 1989, the CCP general secretary has also held the
positions of Central Military Commission chairman and PRC president.
Xi’s policy on maritime territorial disputes and emphasis on maritime
power are factors that have facilitated China’s more “assertive” foreign pol-
icy since around 2009. At the 18th Congress of the CCP in November 2012,
Hu Jintao read out the work report that outlined the overall direction of
policies for the next generation of leaders. Xi participated in drafting the
report. The work report stated, “We should enhance our capacity for ex-
ploiting marine resources, develop the marine economy, protect the marine
ecological environment, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and
interests, and build China into a maritime power.” (17) The sentence clearly
indicates the increased importance the Party places on maritime issues. At
the 8th Politburo study session in August 2014, Xi called for efforts to learn
more about and further manage maritime development. (18)
Institutional reforms
As maritime territorial disputes are becoming a top agenda item, the
CCP is making an effort to improve the decision-making structure and co-
operation among agencies. Especially since becoming general secretary
of the CCP, Xi Jinping has emphasised top-down decision-making and the
importance of the maritime domain, and this has contributed to more
centralised decision-making on maritime issues through the creation of
the Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group, the estab-
lishment of the National Security Commission, the endorsement of de-
fence and military reform, and the consolidation of maritime law
enforcement agencies.
Creating the Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group
(lingdao xiaozu 领导小组 )
The CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee have advisory bodies
known as “leading small groups.” (19) The groups seem to be under the direct
control of the Central Committee of the CCP, and the members are selected
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from relevant sections of the Party, the government, and the PLA, depending
on the issues a group is responsible for. Their concrete responsibilities are
considered to be providing information and recommendations, and coordi-
nation, formation, and supervision of policies. (20) The Central Maritime Rights
Protection Leading Small Group, headed by Xi Jinping, was formed in 2012.
The functions of the group are: 1) to formulate strategies to advance China’s
maritime rights and interests; 2) to coordinate policy among numerous state
entities in charge of maritime affairs; and 3) to manage growing conflict
with other countries over disputed maritime territories. (21)
Establishing the National Security Commission (Zhongyang guojia
anquan weiyuanhui 中央国家安全委员会 )
The National Security Commission was established at the Third Plenary
Session of the 18th Central Committee in November 2013. According to a
communiqué issued after the session, the purpose of this committee is to
improve China’s national security system and strategy to safeguard the
country. (22) General Secretary Xi Jinping stated that China had to establish
a powerful agency to consolidate and control all national security activities
in the relentless foreign and domestic security environment. He then ex-
plained that this would strengthen centralised and unified leadership in the
national security field and that it was an urgent business. (23)
Endorsing defence and military reform
Xi Jinping embarked on the largest military reform plan since the estab-
lishment of the PRC, significantly enhancing Xi’s authority over the military.
In November 2013, Xi announced a comprehensive reform plan that in-
cluded defence and military reform. (24) After two years of preparation, Xi
announced an overall military reform plan that included cuts of 300,000
troops, the creation of a Ground Force Headquarters, Rocket Force, and
Strategic Support Troops, transformation of seven military regions into five
theatre commands, and the abolishment of four General Departments. (25)
The aims of the reform are to turn the PLA into a more effective fighting
force and to enhance political control over the military. In order to do so, Xi
has tried to concentrate power in his own hands. In January 2016, the four
General Departments were abolished, and their functions were divided
among 15 functional departments within the Central Military Commission.
As chairman of the Central Military Commission, Xi holds more power over
the PLA than his predecessors. Moreover, Xi now bears the title of “Com-
mander-in-Chief of the military’s Joint Operations Command Centre,” which
implies that he has operational authority over the PLA. (26)
Consolidation of maritime law enforcement agencies
The Chinese government announced at the National People’s Congress
(NPC) in March 2013 that it would establish the State Oceanic Commission
as the high-level coordination body and a renewed SOA consolidating the
organisations and responsibilities of the previous CMS, Maritime Police,
FLEC, and General Administration of Customs. The responsibility, organisa-
tion, and formation of the new SOA were announced in June 2013, and the
department of China Coast Guard (CCG) (Zhongguo haijingju 中国海警局)
was established within the SOA. The newly established department of the
CCG as the headquarters of the CCG and the CCG Command Centre is in
charge of drafting systems and measures for the enforcement of maritime
law, proposing various regulations, coordinating the joint command of mar-
itime law enforcement activities by CCG units, and training units of the
CCG. The consolidation is expected to improve the effectiveness of China’s
law enforcement activities at sea. (27)
Still, there are some unclear points concerning the organisation and
command structure of the new agency. First, the organisational structure
of the SOA and CCG is complicated. For example, regulations for the
governance of the seas and law enforcement are drafted by the SOA,
and are ultimately authorised and promulgated by the Ministry of Land
and Resources after examination. On the other hand, maritime law en-
forcement activities implemented under the name of the CCG require
the operational guidance of the Ministry of Public Security, and the com-
mander of the CCG is a former vice-minister of the Ministry of Public
Security. (28)
Second, it is also unclear who actually controls the new SOA and CCG. In
terms of high level decision-making, although the announcement in March
2013 stated that the State Oceanic Commission would function as the
high-level coordination body, there is no evidence that the commission is
active. On the operational level, at first glance, it seems that the Ministry
of Public Security has the upper hand, given its responsibility to guide the
operations of the CCG. However, the fact that generals from the People’s
Armed Police, the organisation in charge of domestic security that is under
the dual command of Central Military Commission and State Council, have
taken important positions in CCG may indicate that the PLA has influence
over the CCG. (29)
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Special feature
Inter-agency relations 
Although organisational competition does exist, China is making an effort
to improve coordination between agencies. These efforts, which include bi-
lateral meetings and exercises, contribute to actual coordinated operations.
The PLAN and the SOA have a close relationship. For example, they
reached an agreement to cooperate on research and education in 2009, and
have held regular meetings since then. (30) Moreover, the commanders of
the CCG are apparently trained at the Nanjing Naval Command College. (31)
The Ministry of National Defence website reported that the PLAN actively
cooperates in joint rights protection activities with law enforcement bod-
ies. (32)
Hainan Province and the SOA have also developed cooperation and ex-
changes. Liu Cigui 刘赐贵, director of the SOA from January 2011 to De-
cember 2014, held meetings with Hainan provincial Party secretary Luo
Baoming. Liu Cigui became governor of Hainan Province in February 2015 (33)
in a personnel reshuffle that could contribute to further cooperation. When
Liu Cigui visited the SOA and met with director Wang Hong in March 2015,
they expressed their joint contribution to SCS undertakings. (34)
Cooperation between the CNOOC and the State Oceanic Administration
also seems to be improving. In February 2014, Wang Yilin visited the SOA
and met with then-director Liu Cigui, while Liu visited the CNOOC in May
2014. Liu and Wang expressed their wish for the SOA and CNOOC to co-
operate in building maritime power. (35) Wang said the CNOOC would reli-
ably carry out various projects, along with the related requirements of the
SOA. Deployment of China Coast Guard vessels to protect oil rigs is another
instance of improved coordination.
As discussed later, it is especially important to emphasise the role of the
PLA and local governments in coordinating the operations of maritime ac-
tors. Linda Jakobson notes that when the PLA takes a leading role in mar-
itime operations, a higher level of cooperation between actors can be
achieved. (36)
There are numerous examples showing that these agencies actually co-
operate well in both well-planned and contingency operations. For example,
in October 2012, the PLAN and CCG conducted joint exercises in the East
China Sea. (37) In addition, the Impeccable Incident in 2009 showed that the
PLAN, law enforcement agencies, and Maritime Militia were highly coordi-
nated in their actions to harass the USNS Impeccable. (38) In 2012, China
successfully seized and occupied Scarborough Shoal after a 10-week stand-
off with the Philippines. During the standoff, dozens of government vessels
and fishing boats floated in dangerously close proximity to the reef. (39)
Among these various examples, I have selected the oil rig incident in 2014
and the land reclamation in Spratly Islands, because they are landmarks in
China’s policy in the SCS that have led to the current level of tension.
Case study I: The oil rig incident
On 2 May 2014, the CNOOC placed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 海洋石油
981 (HYSY981) deep water semi-submersible drilling rig roughly 17 nautical
miles south of Triton Island and 120 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam.
The CNOOC oil rig was accompanied by ships from the China Coast Guard,
Maritime Militia, engineering experts, and PLA Navy ships. In response, Viet-
nam dispatched naval and coast guard vessels to the area, and Chinese and
Vietnamese vessels repeatedly collided in the disputed waters. (40) This inci-
dent was remarkable because it was the first time China drilled in the EEZ
claimed by another nation without permission. (41) Although the CNOOC
had originally announced that the oil rig would drill until August 15, it was
withdrawn in mid-July as bad weather approached.
Three factors affecting China’s move illustrate the cooperation among
maritime actors under the leadership of Xi Jinping: the CNOOC’s aspira-
tion to exploit deep waters in the SCS, law enforcement agencies’ push
for protecting and strengthening sovereignty claims, and Xi Jinping’s call
for establishing China as a “major maritime power” (haiyang qiangguo 
海洋强国). (42)
First, as noted in the previous section, the CNOOC has long aspired to ex-
pand oil-exploration activities in the SCS. But the CNOOC has not solely
pursued its own program without regard to other actors. A 2012 Interna-
tional Crisis Group report stated that Chinese oil companies are hesitant to
conduct expensive drilling operations near countries embroiled in territorial
disputes with Beijing because, “If anything happens on the rig those coun-
tries won’t help us.” (43)
In 2012, CNOOC chairman Wang Yilin claimed that HYSY981 is “movable
national territory” and a strategic tool to drive development of the maritime
petroleum industry, which will contribute to achieving China’s energy se-
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curity, developing its maritime power strategy, and protecting sovereignty
in territorial waters. (44)
Wang Yilin emphasised that Xi’s remarks on major maritime power provide
new opportunities, new missions, and new requirements and that the mar-
itime oil industry should become a main force in constructing Chinese mar-
itime power. Wang also emphasised that the CNOOC would enhance its
deep-water strategy, arguing that “deep water is not only an important al-
ternative area for [China’s] oil and gas resources, but also a front position
for protecting [China’s] maritime rights.” (45)
Second, there has been a strong perception among various Chinese agen-
cies that neighbouring countries have taken advantage of China’s desire to
avoid conflict over disputed claims. Liu Cigui, Director of the SOA, reiterated
in a speech at the Central Party School that “we are facing a severe situation
in protecting maritime rights at the periphery. Generally speaking, maritime
resources are deprived, maritime areas are cut gradually, islands are occu-
pied, strategic sea lanes are threatened, and confrontations around the pe-
ripheral area are exploding.” (46) An article in the SOA’s official newspaper
mentioned that China has concentrated its oil exploration efforts in shallow
waters so far, and has not done enough exploration in deep waters in the
SCS. The article argued that “some waters were explored by other neigh-
bouring countries that are challenging our sovereignty in the territorial wa-
ters. China has consistently proposed a principle of ‘shelving disputes and
joint development,’ (gezhi zhengyi, gongtong kaifa 搁置争议，共同开发),
but some neighbouring countries have not taken it into consideration and
are scrambling to take the lead in exploitation.” (47) Based on such percep-
tions, proposals to adopt a more proactive approach have become increas-
ingly salient. 
Third, Xi Jinping has strongly endorsed deep water maritime oil-explo-
ration in the SCS. Xi supported and ordered the CNOOC to put its oil rig
in Vietnamese waters. It would certainly be wrong to assume that the
CNOOC deployed HYSY981 in 2014 against the will of the Party leader-
ship. 
Given the involvement of the CCG and PLA Navy ships, Xi must have
known about the decision to deploy the HYSY981. Given his leadership style
and role as the head of the Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small
Group, Xi likely made the decision to approve deployment of the rig. (48)
Erica Downs argues that China’s oil companies require the permission of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and most likely of top leaders to operate in
these waters. (49) Asahi Shimbun reported that the CNOOC obtained per-
mission from the Party leadership to deploy the oil rig in Vietnamese waters
around the beginning of 2014. (50)
Case study II: Land reclamation
Since around summer 2014, China has conducted massive scale land
reclamation and installation construction at seven features in the Spratly
Islands, including Johnson South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, Fiery
Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, and Hughes Reef.
Although there is no special rule in international law that specifically pro-
hibits any state from undertaking reclamation at sea, and although China
is never the only country conducting land reclamation in the SCS, the speed,
scale, intensity, and remoteness of China’s ongoing manufacturing of land
and infrastructure within the SCS have no parallels in history. US Navy ad-
miral Harry Harris commented, “China is creating a great wall of sand with
dredges and bulldozers.” (51)
Purpose
What is the aim of these reclamation works? There are several possible
goals for the project: strengthening sovereignty claims, improving living
condition of local residents, contributing to the security of international
navigation, and enhancing military power projection.
First, strengthening sovereignty claims is undoubtedly a crucial factor ex-
plaining China’s behaviour. It is doubtful that islands created from submerged
shoals constitute a basis for sovereignty claims, as a low-tide elevation cre-
ates no territorial sea, EEZ, or continental shelf, and cannot be claimed as
territory in its own right. (52) Besides legal arguments, however, creating fea-
tures in the sea contributes to an enhanced presence in the area. Although
China has not admitted that the purpose of land reclamation is to strengthen
sovereignty claims, China’s presence in the Spratlys has been growing.
Second, China’s diplomats and spokespersons have categorically asserted that
the main purpose of land reclamation and installation building is for civilian
use. Liu Zhenmin, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that the purposes
of reclamation are multi-dimensional, but are mainly for civilian purposes. (53)
Ouyang Yujing, director-general of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Af-
fairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also mentioned that it aimed first and
foremost at improving living conditions for personnel stationed there. (54)
Third, China asserts that constructions contribute to its international re-
sponsibilities. Cui Tiankai, ambassador to the United States, told an inter-
viewer that “the main purpose is to improve the functions of facilities there
so as to provide services to ships of China, neighbouring countries and other
countries that sail across the SCS. Such services will include shelter for ships,
navigation aid, search and rescue, marine meteorological observation, fish-
ery service and many others.” (55)
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Special feature
Last but not least, land reclamation and installation construction, espe-
cially the construction of airstrips, ports, and radar facilities, would
strengthen the PLA’s power projection capabilities in the SCS, which were
clearly limited in the past. Massive construction of airstrips would enable
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) to take action around the Spratlys, and PLA air-
craft might therefore be able to cover all of the SCS. Such expansion of ac-
tivities raises arguments and concerns over the establishment of a new Air
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. At the National
People’s Congress in 2014, non-military representatives proposed establish-
ment of the SCS ADIZ, and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) did not deny
this possibility. (56)
Moreover, construction of airstrips and the enhanced power projection
capability of China’s Air Force could have implications beyond the SCS. Ac-
cording to Kanwa Defence Review, the airstrips are designed to be used by
the H-6K bomber, a new type of H-6 bomber equipped with a CJ-10 air-to-
land cruise missile with an attack range of over 2,000 km. In 2015 China
conducted its first Air Force drill in the western Pacific. At that time, several
H-6K bombers passed through the Bashi Channel. Such activities may in-
crease as a consequence of airstrips construction in the SCS. 
Decision-making and implementation
It is still unclear when and by whom reclamation projects in the Spratlys
have been decided. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and other media
report that it was in summer 2014 that large-scale reclamation started on
some reefs. In June 2014, South China Morning Post reported that China
would expand its biggest installation in the Spratly Islands into a fully-formed
artificial island, complete with airstrip and seaport, and other researchers and
media started to keep an eye on it. (57) But according to IHS Jane’s Defence
Weekly, China’s large dredger ship began to appear around the Spratlys in
September 2013. (58) According to Andrew Erickson, reclamation and construc-
tion of the Johnson South Reef probably started around 2012. (59)
Given the scale and timing of the projects, it is highly likely that Xi Jinping
decided the endorsement of the projects. Kanwa Defence Review reported
in 2014 that it was Xi Jinping himself who approved and endorsed the recla-
mation. (60) Likewise, Lee Shiyin-jow, director-general of Taiwan’s National
Security Bureau, stated that China’s land reclamation is taking place on
seven shoals, and that at least five of these have been carried out under the
personal orders of Xi Jinping. (61) It is unclear why he mentioned only five,
not seven, but it is likely that Xi decided the project as a whole.
Although puzzling, it seems that China’s land reclamation effort began
around 2012, but at a scale and speed not noticeable enough for foreigners
to take notice. The scale and speed has increased notably especially since
2014, probably due to strategic decisions made by Xi Jinping.
The PLA, especially the PLAN, is likely taking a central role in implementing
the land reclamation program. According to media reports, in September
2014, PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli inspected the island reclamation
projects for a week. (62) When asked about the inspection tour, an MOD
spokesperson answered briefly that China’s activities on the islands were
“rightful.” (63) In addition, PLAN vessels guarded the construction site, (64) and
a company that made 120 armoured nozzles for dredging revealed that it
was the PLA that ordered the nozzles. (65)
China has dispatched many engineering ships and a large amount of
equipment, most notably the dredger ship Tian Jing. Tian Jing was designed
by Shanghai Jiaotong University and Germany’s Vosta LMG, built by China
Merchant Industry Holdings Ltd., and is now operated by CCCC Tian Jing
Dredging. Construction of the ship, the biggest and the most capable
dredger ship in Asia, began in April 2008 and was completed in January
2010. (66) As noted above, Tian Jing began its operations in the Spratlys in
September 2013, and has rotated among Cuarteron Reef, Johnson South
Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Gaven Reef.
Building administration of Sansha City
The current land reclamation efforts in the Spratlys are not China’s first
attempt to enlarge islands; China has carried out land reclamation and port
construction in the Paracels since 2012. In 2012, the SOA approved a plan
by the Ocean and Fishery Agency of the Hainan provincial government to
enlarge Drummond Island and construct a port on the island. (67)
Land reclamation is part of a broader effort to create Sansha City, a strate-
gic decision by the Party. In a broader perspective, Hainan Province and San-
sha City have become increasingly important because local governments
are charged with establishing administrative control and improve the living
condition of residents. 
Other factors in building administrative control over Sansha City, including
maritime law enforcement agencies, maritime militia, and surveillance net-
works, would contribute to enhancing China’s greater control of the Paracels
and Spratlys. First, the Sansha City government has become an important
actor in coordinating maritime law enforcement activities. In Sansha City,
“military-police-civilian coordination” (junjingmin xietiao军警民协调) has
become a key phrase. According to Xiao Jie, the Mayor of Sansha City, San-
sha has set up a Military-Police-Civilian Coordination Centre, and has con-
ducted a “Six-One Project” and a “Five-in-One-Place Project.” (68) The
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Six-One Project refers to a plan to establish six things: joint maritime de-
fence duty room, information sharing platform, maritime law enforcement
rotation plan, joint maritime law enforcement plan, gradual participation
of justice in the law enforcement mechanism, and maritime militia troops.
The Five-in-One-Place Project refers to the establishment of a residential
committee office, maritime militia post, residential cultural centre, tempo-
rary typhoon shelter, and war time command centre on the reefs where the
residential committee exists.
Xiao Jie emphasised that Sansha City basically carried out regular patrols
and law enforcement in the Paracels. On 6 January 2015, Sansha City con-
ducted a military-police-civilian maritime general law enforcement exer-
cise. (69) The exercise included training for inspection of foreign engineering
ships and search and rescue.
Sansha has set up a General Law Enforcement Bureau that conducts in-
tegrated law enforcement activities. When the Maritime Militia discovers
“illegal” activity by foreign fishing vessels, it reports it to the Sansha Garrison
Command, which then identifies the location of the activity and notifies
law enforcement vessels. (70)
Second, in Hainan Province, building and strengthening the Maritime Mili-
tia has become an important task for local governments. When Xi Jinping
made an inspection tour of Hainan Province in April 2013, he demanded
that Hainan Province fulfil four aims in the SCS entrusted to it by the Party
Centre, namely protecting rights, protecting stability, preserving the mar-
itime environment, and development (weiquan, weiwen, baohu, kaifa 维权,
维稳, 保护, 开发). (71) Xi also met with the maritime militia of Tanmen Town-
ship and demanded that maritime militias actively collect information in
the far seas and support the construction of reefs. (72)
In response to Xi’s demands, Luo Baoming on August 2013 emphasised
the importance of the Sansha construction and mentioned “development
based on civil-military integration, realising the Party Centre’s strategic in-
tention to set up Sansha City, and fulfilling the divine mission of rights pro-
tection, maintaining stability, protecting the environment, and
development.” (73) The Sansha City construction has now become a high-
priority project in Hainan. According to Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy,
Sansha’s first 28 infrastructure projects involved a total investment of 24
billion renminbi (US$3.81 billion), with much more yet to come. (74)
In July 2013, Sansha City established a People’s Armed Forces Department
and Maritime Militia. (75) The Sansha Maritime Militia consists of more than
215 people, and one of its major missions is collecting information, as Xi
Jinping required. (76) The lower-level People’s Armed Forces Department was
already established at Woody Island, Crescent Group, and Qilianyu (northern
part of Amphitrite Group) in the Paracels, as well as in the Spratlys by De-
cember 2014. (77) Third, Hainan Province and Sansha City are constructing a
surveillance and information network in the SCS. In July 2015, the Hainan
Military District built dozens of militia outposts and created a reconnais-
sance-information network. (78) Moreover, Sansha City established informa-
tised militia outposts equipped with a radar identification and surveillance
system to transmit information to the Military-Police-Civilian Coordination
Centre. (79)
Conclusion
This paper shows that a long-term aspiration based on a perception of
victimisation by other countries taking advantage of China’s restrained for-
eign policy has coalesced into a more coherent plan under the strong lead-
ership of Xi Jinping. Of course, as noted in the introduction, because evi-
dence is difficult to collect, any conclusion is necessarily based on interpre-
tation and is open to debate. Even so, the paper identifies three important
developments in China’s maritime policy.
First, coordination between maritime actors is improving, and this is an
important trend. China’s maritime actors may be in competition, but not
to an extent that could disrupt China’s overall strategy. At least they are
working under the broad policy direction of the CCP, and it is therefore
the CCP leadership that is pushing the tough policy line in the SCS. In this
regard, Xi Jinping’s role is important. He has chosen a tougher policy line
than his predecessors and it clearly affects the behaviour of maritime ac-
tors. His consolidation of power has contributed to his enhanced role. At
the same time, institutional reforms initiated under Xi have generated
friction and passive resistance among institutions such as the CCG and
PLA. For example, Linda Jakobson mentioned that the newly established
CCG has not achieved real integration of law enforcement activities. (80)
It is also still unclear whether military reform has been as successfully im-
plemented as Xi anticipated. Moreover, conventional wisdom suggests
that China’s politics becomes unstable around the time of the Party Con-
gress because power struggles within the party tend to intensify as the
Congress approaches. This may affect policy coordination among maritime
actors.
Second, the role of the PLA is operationally salient. In both case studies,
the PLA was the centre of coordination between various actors. On the
other hand, it is unclear what role the PLA took in the policy decision-mak-
ing process. Given Xi Jinping’s consolidated power and his decision-making
style, the PLA’s influence should not be overestimated.
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Third, the mid- to long-term trend is crucial when analysing China’s be-
haviour. In the oil rig case, the CNOOC’s project to explore energy, com-
bined with a sense of crisis on China’s sovereignty claims, contributed to
shaping the background for a tougher policy. In the land reclamation case,
the strategic decision to establish Sansha City and local governments’ ef-
forts to materialise it contributed to the current policy, the objective of
which is to enhance sovereignty claims, not only for the sake of domestic
nationalism but also to diminish US influence in the region by creating a
fait accompli. 
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